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Healthcare Regulation and Governance:
Big Data Analytics and Healthcare Data Protection
Xuejuan Zhang

Several definitions of “big data” have been suggested in the literature as efforts have been
made by many stakeholders to understand this new field. For this paper, the consensus definition
proposed by Grady (2019) in a report published by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, a division of the U. S. Department of Commerce will be used. Grady (2019) wrote,
“Big Data is a term used to describe the large amount of data in the networked, digitized, sensorladen, information-driven world (p. iii).”
The characteristics of big data that force new architectures can be summarized by “4 Vs”
which refer to Volume (i.e., the size of the dataset); Velocity (i.e., rate of flow); Variety (i.e.,
data from multiple repositories); and Variability (i.e., the change in velocity or structure). 1
Grady (2019) argues that the 4 Vs are fundamental drivers dictating the overall design of a
Big Data system resulting in different data system architectures or different analytics life cycle
process orderings to achieve desired performance and cost-efficiency. Cost-effective data
collection, storage, and processing have enabled users across various industries to manage the
size, speed, and complexity of Big Data. In a more digitally connected society and economy,
technological advancements differentiate in advanced analytical tools.
Big Data in Healthcare
Healthcare in the U.S. is a complex ecosystem consisting of various stakeholders including
the following groups (1) public and private healthcare industry members consisting of patients,
clinicians, private payers (i.e., insurance companies), and researchers; (2) broad healthcare
sector members that expand to the business associates of the above-defined private healthcare
industry and the public health providers and financiers; and (3) an even more broadly defined
healthcare ecosystem that includes a broad base of general consumers who have needs for
improving personal health and well-being and utilize the services provided by either public or
private healthcare industry, and (4) those public or private industries or entities who contribute to
the delivery of such services. Figure 1 presents a stakeholder view of the Healthcare Ecosystem,
and Figure 2 presents a relationship diagram among the stakeholders.

Big data do not have qualitative characteristics. There is no consideration, for example, of confusion about
meaning, trust about accuracy (reliability or validity), or cultural relevance. This suggests that none of these is
considered when the design for performance or efficiency is created.
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Figure 1. System of Health Care Stakeholders

Figure 2. Stakeholder Relationship Diagram (Source: https://www.moveo.com/what-wedo/healthcare-ecosystem/)
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The healthcare ecosystem recognizes that broadly defined healthcare includes not only a
person’s episodic medical encounters such as medical and/or care history but also comprehensive
health and lifestyle information. For instance, the manufacturers of personal wearables (e.g.,
Apple Watch, Fitbit wrist band, etc.) and their partners such as Nike have developed hardware
(Apple Watch) and software (e.g., the application of Nike Run Club that can be installed on
Apple Watch and Apple Smartphone) to help people to track their health conditions and healthrelated activities such as diet, mental health, and recreation.
These interdependencies among elements have led to emergent outcomes that become an
unignorable force, especially from the data perspective, because the advancement of technology
has enabled real-time personal health data and behavioral data production and collection in vast
volume and speed. And this massive health and behavioral data generation fall outside the scope
of the traditional narrowly defined healthcare industry.
In the past three decades, the significant digitalization of data in the U.S. healthcare sector is
represented by the development of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), the systemized collection
of patient and population electronically stored information. The paper-based health record,
referred to as an Electronic Medical Record (EMR) is a term often used interchangeably with
EHR. But EHR is a more longitudinal collection of health information of patients or populations,
while an EMR is created by certain providers for specific medical encounters, which can serve as
the data source for an EHR.
The earliest EHR was developed in 1971 and gained popularity by 1992 (Evans, 2016).
EHRs were initially used for claim processing and a means for document capture and later for
clinical decision support (CDS). There are at least two significant changes in the evolution of
EHRs in the U.S. First, personal data are integrated into an EHR, such as mental and behavioral
data, family history, and non-medical data of key life events including data that are external to
the healthcare provider (test results from labs). Second, the EHR users are fast expanding from
clinic to primary care physicians, hospitals, insurance companies, patients, and nursing homes.
This means that EHRs are increasingly used with online medical information and decisionmaking tools, which have changed the dynamics of the patient-clinic interaction through
clinician-patient email, virtual consults, and telemedicine (Evans, 2016).
Through utilizing different sources of data (i.e., medical, lifestyle, financial data), big data
and the application of methods to examine and interpret referred to as big data analytics may not
only help individuals to improve their health and prevent them from seeking care from healthcare
providers but also help to build a dynamic learning process that can identify effective treatments,
drugs, and public health interventions that improve the efficiency of the overall healthcare
system. However, to take full advantage of big data requires that data from different sources can
be collected, transferred, and integrated with advanced analytical tools such as artificial
intelligence and machine learning effectively. However, this is a challenge because there exists a

3

conflict between the public’s concern about data privacy and the required data liquidity to reach
the full potential of big data in healthcare.
Regulatory Framework of Healthcare Data in the U.S.
The development of big data, which enables the collection and transmission of personal
data in vast quantities, has raised the public’s concerns and drew the attention of regulators. For
instance, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an
intergovernmental economic organization that provides advice on public policies and
international standard-setting, updated its guidelines regarding protecting the privacy of personal
data. OCED (2013) lays out the basic principles of both national and international applications,
including a set of principles (Table 1) of collection limitation, purpose specification, use
limitation, individual participation, and accountability, collectively known as the Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).
Table 1: OECD Fair Information Practice Principles
Basic Principles
Collection limitation
Purpose specification

Use limitation

Security Safeguards

Openness
Individual participation

Accountability

Explanation
There should be limits to collecting personal data and any such data should be
obtained by lawful and fair means with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than
at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of
those purposes.
Personal data should not be disclosed, made available, or otherwise used for
purposes other than those specified except 1) with the consent of the data subject; or
2) by the authority of law.
Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such
risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or data
disclosure.
There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices, and
procedures with respect to personal data.
An individual should have the right to confirm whether or not the data controller has
data relating to him; to have data relating to him within reasonable time cost; to be
given reasons if a request of obtaining data relating to him to be denied.
A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give
effect to the principles stated.

A White House report (Executive Office of the President, 2014) on big data highlighted
the mounting pressures on traditional privacy protection measures (i.e., FIPPs). This report
acknowledges the complex legal landscape regarding patient information and privacy and
highlights that the current federal law (i.e., HIPPA 1996) and other privacy laws regulating the
collection of health-related information may not meet consumers’ expectations of privacy. The
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST, 2014) reinforces the
pressure big data places on the FIPPs from a technical perspective. The Health IT Policy
Committee (HITPC) Privacy and Security Workgroup released a report (HITPC, 2015) that
4

provides discussions and recommendations about privacy and security concerns, potentially
harmful uses of big data in healthcare, and potential gaps in privacy and security protection. As
of this writing, Congress is still debating about a national data privacy law to reduce the risk of
consumer data (Healthitsecurity, 2019).
Despite the increased interest in data protection, the legal framework governing the
privacy of personal data is complex, lacks uniformity at the federal level, and may be best
described as “patchwork” (Mulligan, Linebaugh, & W. C. Freeman, 2019). That is, there are
several data protection statutes at the federal statutory level which regulate certain industries and
subcategories of data. These laws vary considerably in their purpose and scope, i.e., governed
entities and data protection requirements. Table 2 provides a summary of major federal data
protection laws. For instance, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 67 imposes several data
protection obligations on financial institutions.
Table 2: Major Federal Data Protection Laws
Federal Law
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA)

Information Protected
Nonpublic personal
information (NPI)

Covered Person
Financial institutions

Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA)

Consumer reports

The Communications Act

Customer proprietary
network information
(CPNI)
Personally identifiable
information (PII)
n/a

Credit Reporting
Agencies (CRAs),
furnishers of information
to CRAs, and users of
consumer reports issued
by CRAs
Common carriers
Cable operators and
satellite carriers

Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC
Act)

Health Insurance
Portability and
Accountability Act
(HIPAA)

All persons or
commercial entities other
than common carriers,
certain financial
institutions, and
nonprofits
Healthcare providers,
health plans, and health
care clearinghouses

Protected health
information (PHI)

Nature of Regulation
Consumer opt-out
requirement for data
sharing;
Consumer disclosure and
data security requirements
Accuracy and use
requirements for
consumer reports;
Consumer disclosure
requirements
Consumer consent
requirement for data
sharing;
Consumer disclosure and
data security requirements
Data privacy and security
policies and practices
must not be “unfair or
deceptive”
Consumer consent
requirement for data
sharing;
Consumer disclosure,
Data security and data
breach disclosure
requirements

Note: this table is adapted from the Appendix of Mulligan, Linebaugh, & W. C. Freeman (2019).
Currently, the legal framework that protects health information privacy in the U.S. is
governed by federal and state laws. At the federal level, the principal law is the Health
5

Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA). HIPPA governs “protected
health information” (PHI), which is individually identifiable information about an individual’s
care, health condition, or payment for care. Under HIPPA, the Privacy Rule applies to “regulated
entities,” including “covered entities” (i.e., health plans, health-care clearinghouses, and most
healthcare providers), and their “business associates” (i.e., entities having access to or using PHI
when performing specified functions or services for the covered entity).
Each state defines its own privacy framework, which usually governs the same entities,
activities, and information as the federal laws. State laws often provide enhanced protections for
sensitive information or vulnerable population (Thorpe & Gray, 2015). In particular, a State law
is "contrary" to the HIPAA Privacy Rule if it would be impossible for a covered entity to comply
with both the State law and the Federal Privacy Rule requirements, or if the State law is an
obstacle to accomplishing the full purposes and objectives of the Administrative Simplification
provisions of HIPAA.
With certain exceptions, the Privacy Rule preempts "contrary" State laws. 2 More broadly,
according to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), more than half the States
considered or introduced consumer data privacy legislation (Greenberg, 2019), and 31 states
enacted cybersecurity-related legislation in 2019 (NCSL, 2019). For example, the California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) became effective on January 1, 2020. CCPA represents
one of the broadest online privacy laws in the U.S. Additional legislation was introduced in 2020
to address the collection and use of biometric or facial recognition data by commercial entities.
For instance, pending the California voters’ approval, California Proposition 24 will further
expand the state’s consumer data privacy laws. It will limit businesses’ use of “sensitive personal
information,” such as precise geolocation, health, and biometric information. It will establish a
California Privacy Protection Agency to enforce and implement consumer privacy laws and
impose administrative fines. 3 Many other states, such as Illinois, Connecticut, and New York are
establishing new consumer data privacy rules to regulate the disclosure of personal information
such as health and genetic testing information and to regulate data brokers collecting of personal
data.
The U.S. regulatory approach of healthcare information can be characterized as a sectoral
and downstream regulation approach (Terry, 2017). The sectoral approach means the entities
and/or information governed by HIPPA are very narrowly defined. Different industries or sectors
may have their own privacy regulations that govern the information for the same patient but not
health-related (such as genomic information and financial information). The lifecycle or valuechain of data may be characterized as a linear sequence of collection, processing, storage and
transfer, and final uses.
Source: https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/adminsimpregtext.pdf?language=es
Source: https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2020-consumer-dataprivacy-legislation637290470.aspx
2
3
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Two concepts related to information protection are “privacy” and “confidentiality.”
“Privacy” provides protections against unauthorized data collection, and “confidentiality”
provides protections against data controllers’ disclosures of collected data. Terry (2017) argues
that HIPPA is more a downstream approach that may inadequately address the data collection.
For instance, data collections outside the traditionally defined healthcare industry are largely
ignored. The recent debate highlights that as the value-chain of big data gets more complicated,
the regulation of use (downstream) seems to be inadequate (Healthitsecurity, 2019).
The systems view of health care refers to very broadly defined stakeholders (in Figure 1)
and government regulators (Figure 2) including entities outside the U.S. One example is the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that became effective on 25 May 2018. It
regulates the processing by an individual, a company, or an organization of personal data relating
to individuals in the EU. In particular, health data are considered sensitive data under the GDPR
Article 9 and the processing thereof can, therefore, only take place under strict requirements.
GDPR is relevant to US regulations because the set of data protection rules described applies to
all companies operating in the EU, wherever they are based including those in the U.S.
Regulations of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learnings
Another of the interdependent elements of the health care system ecosystem (Figure 2) is
health information technology, and specifically the use of advanced analytical tools such as
artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). The European Commission defines AI as
“a collection of technologies that combined data, algorithm, and computing power” (European
Commission, 2020). AI can also be integrated with hardware. In case of ML techniques, which
constitute a subset of AI, algorithms are trained to infer certain patterns based on a set of data to
determine the actions needed to achieve a given goal. Algorithms may continue to learn when in
use (European Commission, 2020). AI has been promoted by advocates as having the potential to
bring benefits to individuals, businesses, and society as a whole. For instance, a new generation
of AI-backed products and services in healthcare (e.g., wearables and health apps) has had a
significant impact on society.
At the same time, the broad adoption of AI also creates many legal and ethical
challenges. Specific to the application of AI in healthcare, ethical challenges may include
informed consent to use, safety and transparency, algorithmic fairness and biases, and data
privacy (Gerke, Minssen & Cohen, 2020). Table 3 provide several examples of ethical
challenges.
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Table 3: Ethical Challenges Related to AI application in Healthcare
Ethical Issues
Informed consent to use

Examples
• A need to examine under what circumstances the principles of informed
consent should be deployed in clinical AI space. E.g., the clinicians’
responsibilities to educate the patients bout the AI and ML used by the system,
the data inputs, and the possibility for bias.
• Consumers’ consent to AI health apps and chatbots that constantly update
themselves along with user agreements.
Safety and transparency
• IBM Watson for Oncology software gave “unsafe and incorrect”
recommendations for cancer treatment because the software was trained by
“synthetic” cancer cases instead of real patient data.
• AI developers shall be transparent about the data used and any shortcomings of
the software because transparency can foster trust among stakeholders.
Algorithmic fairness and biases • AI bears a risk for biases and discrimination due to the ML procedure and
training data used. For instance, an AI-based clinical decision support software
for skin cancer could provide inaccurate recommendation if it was
predominantly trained by Caucasian patients.
• AI developed for experts in resource-rich settings (e.g., high-income countries)
will not necessarily recommend treatments that are accurate, safe, and fair in
low-resource settings (e.g., low-income countries).
Data privacy
• Data used outside the doctor-patient relationship can negatively affect patients,
such as impacting insurance premiums and job opportunities.

Because AI is one of the most critical applications of the data economy and can have a
major impact on our society, governments and regulators have paid attention to the regulatory
framework regarding AI. International organizations such as OECD, G20 and governments in
Europe and Asia have proposed principles and regulatory frameworks in the past few years.
OECD adopted its Principles on Artificial Intelligence in May 2019. This is the first
international standard agreed by governments. In June 2019, the G20 adopted human-centered
AI Principles that draw from the OECD AI Principles in Ministerial Statement on Trade and
Digital Economy. 4The set of Principles promotes the trustworthiness of AI-based on its
compliance with the law, human rights democratic values and diversity, transparency and
responsible disclosure of adoption, human-centric approach for AI-based decision making, and
responsible usage of AI by individuals and organizations. Those principles include the issues
presented in Table 4. 5

4
5

Source: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000486596.pdf
Retrieved from: https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles/
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Table 4: Principles of Trustworthiness
1) AI should benefit people and the planet by driving inclusive growth, sustainable development,

and well-being.
2) AI systems should be designed in a way that respects the rule of law, human rights, democratic
values, and diversity, and they should include appropriate safeguards – for example, enabling
human intervention where necessary – to ensure a fair and just society.
3) There should be transparency and responsible disclosure around AI systems to ensure that
people understand AI-based outcomes and challenge them.
4) AI systems must function in a robust, secure, and safe way throughout their life cycles and
potential risks should be continually assessed and managed.
5) Organizations and individuals developing, deploying, or operating AI systems should be held
accountable for their proper functioning in line with the above principles.

The European Union (EU) set its policy options for AI in February 2020. Similar to
OECD principles, European AI is grounded in its values and fundamental rights, such as human
dignity and privacy protection. EU’s AI regulatory framework focuses on trustworthiness by
building an “ecosystem of trust” along the whole value chain starting from research to the
applications of AI in various scenarios. EU’s AI regulatory framework recognizes that AI can
cause harm. This harm might be both material (safety and health of individuals, including loss of
life, damage to property) and immaterial (loss of privacy, limitations to the right of freedom of
expression, human dignity, discrimination for instance in access to employment), and can relate
to a wide variety of risks. Therefore, EU’s AI regulatory framework adopts a risk-based
approach to support that the regulatory intervention is proportionate (European Commission,
2020). Under this framework, an AI application should be considered high-risk, where it meets
the following two cumulative criteria:
(1) the AI application is employed in a sector where, given the characteristics of the activities
typically undertaken, significant risks can be expected to occur.
(2) the AI application in the sector in question is, in addition, used in such a manner that significant
risks are likely to arise.

The first criterion addresses that the regulatory intervention is targeted to the areas where
risks are deemed most likely to occur, such as healthcare, transport, energy, and parts of the
public sector. The second criterion reflects the acknowledgment that not every use of AI in the
selected sectors necessarily involves significant risks. For example, while healthcare generally
may be a relevant sector, a flaw in the appointment scheduling system in a hospital will normally
not pose risks of such significance as to justify legislative intervention. The assessment of the
level of risk of a given use could be based on the impact on the affected parties (European
Commission, 2020).
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Several requirements would apply to high-risk AI applications only, including training
data, data and record-keeping; information to be provided; robustness and accuracy; human
oversight; with specific requirements for certain particular AI applications, such as those used for
purposes such as remote biometric identification (European Commission, 2020). For instance,
regarding human oversight, the regulatory framework (Figure 3) requires that the design of AI
system must impose operational constraints of AI, the monitoring of AI consider the ability of
human intervention in real-time, and the output of AI system that becomes effective immediately
must be ensured with human intervention (e.g., human review) afterward.
Figure 3: EU Risk-based AI Model Framework

AI Related Risk of Potential
Harm
• Fundamental rights and
consumer rights
( including personal data
and privacy protection,
and non-discrimination)
• Safety
• Liability

AI Risk Assessment
1. Is AI applied in a sector
where significant risk can
be expected to occur?

2. Is AI application in the
sector in question used in
a manner that significant
risk can be expected to
occur?

High AI Risk
Requirements
• Training data
• Data and record-keeping
• Information to be
provided
• Robustness and accuracy
• Human oversight
• Specific requirements
(e.g., remote biometric
identification)

On January 23, 2019, Singapore implemented the first edition of the Model AI Governance
framework (Model Framework), which was revised on January 21, 2020. In the Model Framework,
there are two principles for responsible AI: (1) decisions made by AI should be explainable,
transparent and fair; (2) AI solutions should be human-centric.
The Model Framework also highlights four areas for consideration: (1) internal governance
structure and measures (including clear roles and responsibilities in organizations; SOPs to
monitor and manage risks; staff training); (2) determining the level of human involvement in AIaugmented decision-making (including appropriate human involvement; minimizing the risk of
harm to individuals); (3) operations management (including minimizing bias in data and model;
risk-based approach to measures such as explainability, robustness and regular tuning); (4)
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stakeholder interaction and communication (including making AI policies known to users;
allowing users to provide feedback; making communications easy to understand). 6
In general, depending on one’s role in a decision-making process, the decision models can
be classified into three types presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Decision Model and Human Intervention
Decision-making Type
Human-in-the-loop

Human-out-the-loop

Human-over-the-loop or Humanon-the-loop

Human’s Role
Human oversight is active and involved in
and interpretation and retains full control.
Decisions cannot be exercised without
affirmative actions by humans.
No human oversight over the execution of
decisions

Human is in a monitoring or supervisory
role, e.g., can adjust parameters during the
execution of the algorithm

AI’s Role
Only provides input or
recommendations

AI has full control over the
data analysis and decisionmaking without the option of
human override
AI has certain control over
the data analysis and
decision-making

The Model Framework proposes a design framework (see Figure 4) to help organizations
determine the level of human involvement required in AI-augmented decision-making. This
design framework is structured along two axes: (a) probability; and (b) severity of harm to an
individual (or organization) as a result of the decision made by an organization about that
individual (or organization).
Figure 4: Risk Assessment Matrix for Harm due to AI

Source: https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Resource-forOrganisation/AI/SGModelAIGovFramework2.pdf
6
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The definition of “harm” and the computation of probability and severity depend on the
context and vary from sector to sector. For example, the harm associated with a wrong diagnosis
of a patient’s medical condition differs from a clothing store’s wrong product recommendation
for apparel. More importantly, “harm” is also a dynamic and temporally non-linear concept
because the harmful results related to the utilization of AI in certain practices may not be
perceived or understood immediately.
Complexity of Big Data in Healthcare
The outbreak of coronavirus (COVID-19) in 2020 and the subsequent efforts to contain
this pandemic using technologies provide an example of the complexity of data privacy in the
public health sector. According to WHO, the confirmed cases of COVID-19 infection and death
worldwide on October 30, 2020, were 45.92 million and 1.19 million, respectively. To improve
understanding of COVID-19 infectious diseases via social distancing and contact tracing, there
has been a global wave of experiments using smartphones involving Google and Apple in April
2020. In Europe, 17 EU member states were using some type of mobile contact tracing apps. 7
Mobile apps are also used in Asia (e.g., Korea and China) and Middle East (e.g., Kuwait and
Bahrain).
The United States federal response has taken a decentralized approach, with most
COVID-19 contact-tracing apps being developed and rolled out by state governments (Figliola,
2020). Individual states such as North Dakota, South Dakota, Nevada, and Utah have
independently deployed DCT apps by engaging the private sector. Most of the contact-tracing
apps in the US are built on the Apple-Google protocol announced in April 2020. 8 The users
must voluntarily download and opt into an appropriate state or regional tracing app as well as opt
into the tracking feature in the smartphone operating system. Once enabled, a person’s
smartphone will exchange anonymous identifier beacon keys with nearby smartphones using the
Bluetooth signal. The randomly generated identifier beacon key remains on a person’s
smartphone unless they report a positive COVID-19 diagnosis through the app. If one of the
users later enters information (says) to the app that they have tested positive for COVID-19, the
phone will upload the last 14 days of proximate contact data to a server, and those logged
contacts will get alerts on their smartphones. For instance, the covered entity will include any
entity or persona engaged in contact-tracing and exposure notification or develop tools for
contact-tracing and exposure notification. Moreover, each bill will protect the specific data
collected (such as geolocation data or any information linked or reasonably linked to any
individual), besides personal health information.

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/travel-during-coronaviruspandemic/mobile-contact-tracing-apps-eu-member-states_en
8
Source: https://covid19.apple.com/contacttracing
7
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However, the experimentation of tracing apps does not meet its expectation. An article
from Washington Post attributes the setbacks of tracing apps to the limited functions and
people’s distrust (Washington Post, 2020). For instance, the tracing apps only send alerts without
information regarding when, where, and by whom people might have been exposed. Moreover,
sensitive personal data, such as location data, that are key for tracing are not included in many
apps in Western countries. In contrast, countries in Asia are willing to take more aggressive
actions. For instance, the government in Hong Kong will not disclose confirmed COVID-19
cases that can be used to identify a specific person. But it will share the information regarding
where they live and where they have been to in the past fourteen days with the public to take
precautions. In the EU, health data are considered sensitive data under the GDPR (Article 9).
However, the GDPR provides that one of the legal grounds for processing personal data is public
interest in the area of public health. Aggregated statistical data that do not enable identifying the
concerned natural persons (for instance aggregated location data) are not considered personal
data, and therefore the GDPR does not apply. 9 Even though the COVID-19 tracing apps in
Europe face similar problems that they have in the U.S., EU had set up an EU-wide system in
October 2020 to ensure interoperability of COVID-19 contact tracing apps among member
states. 10
In the U.S., the pandemic of COVID-19 also put the flexibility and adaptability of HIPPA
to a test in this public health emergency. In February 2020, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided a guideline regarding how
patient health information (PHI) could be permissibly shared in compliance with HIPAA in the
event of an outbreak of infectious disease or other emergencies. For instance, Health care
providers may share PHI with anyone to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to
public health and safety (Shah & Hedgeman, 2020). However, in practice, it appears that in the
U.S., neither the private sector nor the public sector takes advantage of those guidelines in
tracing and containing COVID-19 possibly due to privacy concerns.
In response to the pandemic and the need for contact-tracing, as of June 26, 2020, data
privacy bills had been introduced to address the privacy issues related to digital contact-tracing
and exposure notification (Gaffney, 2020), including:
1. the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020 (CCDPA), S. 3663, introduced by Senators
Roger Wicker, John Thune, Jerry Moran, Marsha Blackburn, and Deb Fischer on May 7, 2020;
2. the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA), companion bills S. 3749 and H.R. 6866,
introduced, respectively, by Senators Richard Blumenthal and Mark Warner and Representatives
Anna Eshoo, Janice Schakowsky, Suzan DelBene, Yvette Clarke, G.K. Butterfield, and Tony
Cardenas on May 14, 2020; and
Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/digital-solutions_en#europeansupercomputers-fighting-the-coronavirus
10
Source: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/coronavirus-eu-interoperability-gateway-goes-livefirst-contact-tracing-and-warning-apps-linked
9
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3. the Exposure Notification Privacy Act (ENPA), S. 3861, introduced by Senators Maria Cantwell
and Bill Cassidy on June 1, 2020.

Those three bills take a similar approach to regulate contact-tracing data. e.g., a covered
entity would have to take certain procedures before and after collecting covered data. In general,
those proposed bills will expand the definitions or the scopes of the covered entity and covered
data. For instance, the covered entity will include any entity or persona engaged in contacttracing and exposure notification or develop tools for contact-tracing and exposure notification.
Moreover, each bill will protect the specific data collected (such as geolocation data or any
information linked or reasonably linked to any individual), besides personal health information.
The system perspective notes that interactions among the general public, the public health
authorities, and the regulators create challenges such that a trade-off between the cost of
pandemic and data privacy results. The apparent conflict is that the fast spread of COVID-19
leaves little time for legal and ethical debates of personal data privacy and remedies of a
complicated U.S. health data privacy system. Remington and Pollack (2007) suggest four types
of project complexity i.e., structural, technical, directional, and temporal complexity that may
describe how to understand the adoption of COVID-19 tracing apps in the U.S. (see Table 5).
The structural, directional, and temporal complexity are all ranked high because of the lack of a
grand strategy, coordination of federal and state government, and collective efforts. In contrast,
the technical complexity is rated as medium not because we do not have a disposable technology
but because the related legal and ethical issues of data privacy complicate the choice and use of
technologies. Figure 5 provides the project complexity profile for digital contact-tracing.
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Table 5: Mapping Project Complexity for Digital Contact-Tracing in U.S.
Dimension
Structural
(number of dependencies)

Technical
(Impact of unresolved technical/design
issues

Directional
(ambiguity/lack of agreement on goals)

Temporal
(Expected time delays at key project
stages)

Evaluation
• The fragmented state-by-state approach in developing
and adopting COVID-19 tracing apps in the US
greatly limits the effectiveness of such a tactic (Barber
& Knight 2020, Timberg et al., 2020).
• States have fewer incentives to invest in COVID-19
because the federal government does not provide them
any financial supports
• Digital contact-tracing must rely on other successful
measures, including fast and cheap testing, quick
follow-up, and effective quarantine and isolation
procedures.
• Bluetooth-based contact -tracing apps have some
limitations. For instance, the current Apple-Google
protocol emphasizes personal data privacy, and the
apps do not collect key personal information such as
location data, which is essential to containing the
spread of the COVID-19 from the public health
perspective.
• Legal challenges related to personal data privacy in
the U.S., i.e., how to protect the information and
entities involved in digital contact-tracing.
• Fighting a pandemic like COVID-19 requires a clear
vision and strong leadership, quick responses based on
scientific evidence, and collective efforts from the
individuals and the society as a whole. However, there
is no clear direction regarding how and what to do to
fight the pandemic.
• The general public’s trust and cooperation in the
effectiveness of digital contact-tracing and other
public health measures (mask, social distancing, etc.)
• The value and importance of digital contact-tracing
could change over time. For instance, the priority for
contact-tracing could be lower for states with high
positive testing rates that combat the congested health
care system. Moreover, the advent of the COVID-19
vaccine could also compete for the limited financial
resources at both the federal and state level.
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Project
Complexity
High

Medium

High

High

Figure 5: Project Complexity Profile for Digital Contact-Tracing in U.S.

Big data analytics, along with the advanced analytical tools such as AI and ML, has the
potential to change the landscape of the health care systems, for example, by optimizing
workflows in healthcare providers, providing more accurate diagnoses, and improving the
overall quality of services to patients and the general public. However, it also raises challenges
for the regulators worldwide regarding how to minimize the potential “harms,” such as data
privacy, brought by these new analytical tools and decision-making models.
To do so, certain essential features of complex systems in health care must be considered.
Unlike data systems, human systems are purposeful, self-organizing and constantly adapt to
change; they are driven by the interactions between systems components and governed by
meaningful feedback; and they are nonlinear and hard or impossible to predict, with changes in
one part of the system causing unexpected changes in other sub-systems. The development of big
data analytics and its applications in various business decision-making processes share some
similar features. For instance, the analytical tools are fast evolving, and the ways that data are
collected, shared, and analyzed are fast changing. Therefore, a “systems” perspective is vitally
important (Gerke et al., 2020) and argues for consideration of the following recommendations
for effective regulation of big data analytics in health care:
1. Due to the large number of elements that interact in nonlinear and dynamics ways,
regulators should take a holistic view because the entire value chain of big data analytics
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can go beyond the traditionally defined health care industry with the participation of
stakeholders outside the current laws and regulations.
2. Due to individual interactions, influences and relationships, organizational should embark
on a continuous learning process to discover emerging patterns as a foundation for a more
effective regulatory approach. Because big data analytics is fast evolving, and the context
where big data analytics are applied is rapidly changing, there is no clear separation
between the “benefit” and “harm.” Regulators should understand the context and this
should be reflected in the history of the system. In particular, the risk assessment of the
application of AI/ML must reflect the changes in external conditions and the system
itself.
3. All stakeholders should realize that the people in the system shape the system and are
influenced by the system. Regulators should emphasize a human-centric regulatory
approach and develop policies that will foster positive feedback (such as trust,
cooperation) from the people in the system.
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